nature neurOSCIenCe a r t I C l e S Humans display remarkable flexibility in their behavior. Like other animals, we guide our behavior through direct experience, but we can also infer the likely consequences of actions that have never been taken 1,2 . Through generalizing principles and applying them to new situations 3,4 , we can predict new relationships and statistical structures in our environment and use these to estimate the value of new events 1, 5, 6 . Although some progress has been made in uncovering the brain regions that underlie these complex abilities 1,3-7 , little or no progress has been made in understanding how neuronal networks support these complex computations, partly because it is unclear to what extent such computations exist in species in which we can readily measure single-cell activity.
a r t I C l e S
Humans display remarkable flexibility in their behavior. Like other animals, we guide our behavior through direct experience, but we can also infer the likely consequences of actions that have never been taken 1, 2 . Through generalizing principles and applying them to new situations 3, 4 , we can predict new relationships and statistical structures in our environment and use these to estimate the value of new events 1, 5, 6 . Although some progress has been made in uncovering the brain regions that underlie these complex abilities 1, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , little or no progress has been made in understanding how neuronal networks support these complex computations, partly because it is unclear to what extent such computations exist in species in which we can readily measure single-cell activity.
One potential mechanism that allows for upcoming events to be evaluated involves using past experience to predict consequences of future possible scenarios. In rodents, hippocampal firing sequences at choice points predict or 'preplay' the forthcoming environment 8 , and the likely outcomes of their decision can later be decoded in the orbitofrontal cortex 9 . In contrast, when choosing between novel options, there is no direct experience from which to preplay and evaluate future options. However, it is possible that the representation of an upcoming novel outcome may be constructed by combining multiple distinct relevant experiences, preplayed simultaneously.
To test these predictions, we required access to the information content of neural populations underlying the representation of a novel experience. Despite the poor spatial resolution of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), there are well-validated strategies that can reveal underlying cellular representations. For example, fMRI adaptation takes advantage of the fact that activated cellular ensembles in a voxel show a relative suppression in their activity in response to repetition of a stimulus to which they recently responded. Despite ambiguity in the biophysical mechanism underlying repetition suppression 10, 11 , when combined with careful experimental design the technique allows for inferences to be made about the underlying neuronal representations 12, 13 .
We used fMRI adaptation to probe the neural representation of a novel food reward. We hypothesized that, if the representation of a novel food was constructed by explicit combination of multiple distinct experiences, we would observe fMRI adaptation when subjects evaluated a novel reward immediately after evaluating a component ingredient. Furthermore, if multiple experiences were replayed simultaneously, plasticity might result between the underlying neuronal assemblies. Hence, experiences used to construct the same novel good would later adapt to each other. Lastly, we hypothesized that this complex construction process would not be required after an independent neuronal representation of the novel good had been established. We should therefore observe a reduction in each adaptation effect after allowing the subjects to either experience the novel good directly or simulate the novel good repeatedly. This repetition suppression procedure allowed us to probe the neural mechanisms that underlie human capacity for flexible, online, value construction.
RESULTS

Deciding between novel goods
We created 13 novel goods whose values were unknown to the subjects (Fig. 1) . However, each good was a novel combination of two different familiar foods (Fig. 1a) . Participants were given the opportunity to observe these novel goods without being allowed to sample them by either taste or smell.
To first establish that these goods activate known value-related brain regions, we measured fMRI activity in 19 subjects while they evaluated and chose from pairs of these novel goods (Fig. 1b) . After the scan session, subjects performed a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction 14 that allowed us to measure subjects' constructed value for each good. Consistent with reports in simpler valuation a r t I C l e S contexts, we observed a signal that correlated with the value of the chosen option in a network of brain regions that included ventral and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC and dmPFC, respectively), and posterior cingulate cortex (mPFC: P = 0.001 familywise error (FWE) corrected on cluster level, peak t 17 = 6.30; Fig. 2a ). The involvement of both vmPFC and dmPFC is of particular interest given that the task required subjects to construct and evaluate a model of a future outcome. This involvement accords with recent evidence that vmPFC encodes value preference for executable choices and dmPFC does so for choices that are modeled abstractly 7 .
To evaluate these novel goods, subjects could not rely on pre-learnt values. Thus, their only recourse was to construct, online, an expectation of the compound's value from knowledge of the individual components. A key question is whether subjects constructed a novel representation of the compound by explicitly combining the representations of each component and, if so, which brain regions support this construction process. We reasoned that this construction process could be measured using fMRI adaptation. Activity relating to the construction of the compound value would be suppressed when preceded by a related component if, and only if, the subject had engaged the neuronal ensembles of the components when constructing a representation of the compound.
Constructing representations of novel goods using memories
For every participant, we selected 2 of the 13 novel compounds, here referred to as AB and CD, each consisting of two familiar individual components (A and B, C and D) that subjects had tasted immediately before the experiment (Fig. 1a) . To avoid visual confounds in a later analysis, we trained subjects to associate each of the six component and compound foods (A, B, C, D, AB and CD) with two different abstract shapes (Fig. 1c) . Participants trained extensively on these associations between food items and abstract shapes. In the final block of trials, the mean accuracy was 97.8%, with a mean reaction time of 845.2 ms.
On each trial in the scanner, we presented a distinct shape that served as an instruction cue for subjects to elicit an explicit mental representation of the associated food (Fig. 1d) . The key comparison of interest here was the brain activity elicited by novel goods when preceded by related components (for example, A or B followed by AB) compared with novel goods when preceded by unrelated components (for example, C or D followed by AB).
Early in the experiment (block 1 of 3), we observed fMRI adaptation between the representation of novel goods and their constituent components in both mPFC (P < 0.001, FWE corrected on cluster level, peak t 18 = 4.45; Fig. 2b ) and bilateral hippocampus (t 18 = 2.55, P = 0.010 using region of interest (ROI) analysis; Online Methods and Fig. 2b ). These two brain regions are components of a network that is commonly activated in studies of value 7, [15] [16] [17] [18] , episodic memory 4, 19, 20 and spatial navigation 12 . Our result implies that these brain regions construct a value representation of a novel item from component memories, and do so by simultaneously engaging neuronal representations of these components.
Plasticity between simultaneously active memories If this is the case then it follows that during the construction of the compound good AB, the neuronal ensembles representing components A and B should be simultaneously active. We reasoned that this simultaneous activity, which first occurred during the stimulus-item training phase before scanning, would induce experience-dependent plasticity between cellular elements in these two ensembles-a plasticity evident in the scanning trials as a shadow of this value construction process. For example, after constructing a representation of 'tea-jelly dessert' , we reasoned that cellular representations of tea would induce activity in jelly-preferring ensembles and vice versa. This can also be tested using fMRI adaptation, which predicts a differential effect for components that were part of the same compound compared with components that were not. Indeed, when we compared early trials of A that were preceded by B to those that were preceded by C, we again found relative suppression in mPFC activity (P = 0.014, FWE corrected on cluster level, peak t 18 = 4.24; Fig. 2c ), but not hippocampus (t 18 = 0.34, P = 0.367 using ROI analysis, Online Methods).
Notably, across all three blocks, the extent to which individual participants showed adaptation between related components in mPFC, and in the hippocampus, was predicted by the average value of the novel items (mPFC, r = 0.47 and P = 0.040; hippocampus, r = 0.58 and P = 0.010), but not component items (mPFC, r = −0.05, P = 0.833; hippocampus, r = −0.09, P = 0.730). This suggests that the mechanism underlying this suppression occurred during the earlier construction of the novel good and not during the participant's elicitation of the component item at the time that this signal was measured. Indeed, in both structures, the correlation with the value of the novel good survived the removal of any signal attributable to the component values npg a r t I C l e S (mPFC, r = 0.51, P = 0.015, Fig. 2d ; hippocampus, r = 0.60, P = 0.004; Fig. 2e and Supplementary Fig. 1 ). Together, these findings support value-dependent plasticity in related components as a consequence of coactivation during construction of the novel goods.
It is important to note that these three de facto tests of mPFC function (valuation, construction and plasticity) do not rely on the same data. Despite slight differences in thresholded peak locations of the two adaptation effects, they showed similar patterns of activity in mPFC (Fig. 2f) . mPFC can therefore evaluate novel goods by constructing explicit representations of expected outcomes from familiar components, a process that engenders plasticity between simultaneously active component representations.
The influence of sensory experience upon construction
We then asked whether consummatory exposure to the novel goods would reduce a need to construct value online. To test this idea, we repeated the experiment in a second group of 20 subjects with one important difference. This second group (familiar) was given a single sample of each of the 13 novel compound goods to taste before the experiment. Notably, both groups underwent the same item-stimulus learning task before entering the scanner, and there was no significant difference between groups in reaction time or accuracy on the final block of trials during the learning task (P > 0.150; Supplementary Table 1) . Any difference between the two groups in the representation or evaluation of novel goods could therefore be attributed to the effect of sensory exposure.
We first assessed value effects during decision trials. Both groups showed similar consistency in their choices (Supplementary Fig. 2) . As was the case for the unfamiliar group, the familiar group encoded chosen value activity in a network of value-related brain regions that included mPFC (Fig. 3a) . In both groups, the neural activity observed in mPFC was consistent with a role for this brain region in the evaluation of compound goods (Fig. 3b,c) .
To determine whether this single experience was enough to reduce a need for online value construction, we compared adaptation effects across the two groups. To avoid selection bias, we used ROIs derived from whole-brain adaptation effects averaged across both adaptation contrasts in the two groups (Online Methods and Fig. 4a,b) . A between-group comparison in these ROIs revealed significant differences in the adaptation effects between the familiar and unfamiliar participants in both mPFC (group × condition interaction, P = 0.018, F 1,144 = 5.76, three-way ANOVA, Online Methods) and hippocampus (group × adaptation type × condition interaction, P = 0.035, F 1,144 = 4.52, three-way ANOVA, Online Methods). The mPFC and hippocampus showed repetition suppression to a novel good when preceded by a related component (for example, tea-jelly preceded by tea) compared with when preceded by an unrelated component (for example, tea-jelly preceded by avocado). (c) The mPFC showed repetition suppression to a component food item when preceded by the related component (for example, tea preceded by jelly) compared with when preceded by an unrelated component (for example, tea preceded by avocado). (d,e) In mPFC and hippocampus, a significant positive correlation was revealed between the amount of suppression between related components (across all blocks) and the average value participants assigned to the novel goods (after removing effects attributable to the value of the components; for mPFC: r = 0.51, P = 0.015; hippocampus, r = 0.60, P = 0.004), respectively. (f) Both adaptation effects showed comparable effect size across the ventral-todorsal gradient of mPFC (mean ± s.e.m. across participants). The locations of the ROIs are shown and the effect size for both adaptation measures was scaled such that the peak value was equal to 1. There was no significant difference between the two adaptation effects at any point on this gradient (P > 0.300 for all ROIs). npg a r t I C l e S Using post hoc two-sample t tests to decompose these interactions, we found that, relative to the unfamiliar group, the familiar group showed reduced adaptation between the novel goods and their related components in mPFC (group difference: trend, t 18 = 1.70, P = 0.053; Fig. 4c ) and in the hippocampus (group difference: t 18 = 3.11, P = 0.003; Fig. 4c) . Furthermore, the familiar group did not show plasticity in mPFC between the representation of the constituent components of a novel good (group difference: t 18 = 1.96, P = 0.033, Fig. 4c ). Crucially, there was no significant difference between groups in their ability to accurately elicit the correct representations during the imagination task (group comparison of accuracy, P = 0.82; reaction time, P = 0.89) or in the average subjective value assigned to any of the novel goods used in the adaptation task (P > 0.05 for all assigned novel goods; Supplementary Fig. 3 ). This result therefore suggests that even a single previous experience of a good is sufficient to reduce a requirement for online value construction. This is particularly notable given that extensive experience is required to reduce goal-oriented behavior and establish habitual actions 21 .
Temporal dynamics of the construction mechanism
If experiential and constructed valuation use distinct neural mechanisms, it is possible that the value construction mechanism could itself substitute for a direct experience and train experiential valuation mechanisms. As the experiment progressed, subjects gained substantial experience in constructing the representation of the novel good. We asked whether, after multiple previous simulations of an experience, it was still necessary to construct and evaluate the representation of novel goods anew on each trial. Alternatively, were values learned despite participants never having experienced the novel good? As our experiment extended over three separate blocks, we were able to study changes in value construction-related adaptation effects over time (Figs. 5 and 6 ).
Previous studies have found that goal-directed choice mechanisms exhibit marked differences early and late in choice experiments 17 . We used a three-way ANOVA (Online Methods) to identify attenuation of adaptation effects in mPFC and hippocampus in the unfamiliar group across the scanning session (block × condition interaction for mPFC, P = 0.004, F 1,144 = 8.44; block × adaptation-type interaction for hippocampus, P = 0.011, F 1,144 = 6.56). Post hoc t tests comparing block 1 with all remaining blocks revealed a significant reduction in adaptation over time of a novel good to its related component (mPFC, t 18 = 2.12, P = 0.024; hippocampus, t 18 = 2.13, P = 0.024; Fig. 5a ) and in the plasticity between related components (mPFC, t 18 = 1.85, P = 0.041; but not hippocampus, t 18 = 0.81, P = 0.785; Fig. 6a) .
To ensure that sensitivity to the construction process was maintained across the duration of the experiment, we also considered temporal dynamics of other adaptation effects and of value signals encoded on decision trials. In the unfamiliar group, both adaptation in mPFC to repetition of any item (but not stimulus) and adaptation in visual areas to repetition of a stimulus did not show a reduction over time (one-tailed paired t tests, t 18 = 0.46, P = 0.326; Fig. 5a ; t 18 = 0.50, P = 0.312; Supplementary Fig. 4a) . Furthermore, the chosen value signal encoded by mPFC also did not reduce over time, but instead remained consistent across sessions (Fig. 3c) . In addition, performance on the imagination task improved across blocks (Fig. 5b,c) . Rather than a loss of sensitivity, this suggests that the diminishing adaptation effects demonstrate that simulated experience is sufficient npg a r t I C l e S to establish an independent representation of the novel good that no longer needs to be reconstructed anew on each trial. Despite the overall reduction of cross-component suppression over the course of the experiment, this was not true for components that had been used to construct high-value novel goods. When averaging across the final two blocks, both the mPFC and hippocampus showed a significant positive correlation with the value of the compound items (mPFC, r = 0.64, P = 0.002; hippocampus, r = 0.63, P = 0.003, Fig. 6b,d and Supplementary Fig. 5 ), after accounting for variance explained by the value of the component items in both cases. A median split of participants according to the value assigned to the novel goods subsequently verified that there was long-lasting plasticity in mPFC and hippocampus in the final two blocks for those participants who attributed high, but not low, values to the novel goods (mPFC: high, t 8 = 2.84, P = 0.022; high versus low, t 8 = 2.68, P = 0.028; hippocampus: high, t 8 = 3.52, P = 0.008; high versus low, t 8 = 5.36, P < 0.001; Fig. 6c,e) . Suggestive evidence that value-dependent adaptation between related component items emerged later in hippocampus relative to mPFC (Fig. 6c,e) could not be verified statistically (t 8 = 1.30, P = 0.229). Together, these results suggest that the plasticity is long-lasting if value is attributed to the original association.
DISCUSSION
The role of memory in prospective evaluation and inference has been emphasized in both animals 22 and humans 3, 4, 20 . Simulation and preplay can be used to explore an internal model of the environment and evaluate anticipated outcomes 8, 23 . However, the neural mechanisms by which these processes are achieved have remained unclear, particularly in circumstances in which anticipated outcomes have not previously been experienced. We used repetition suppression in fMRI to reveal a neuronal mechanism that supports prospective representation and evaluation of novel experiences.
Repetition suppression has been used extensively in sensory brain regions to probe the information content of neural activations and, more recently, in more frontal brain regions, including orbitofrontal cortex 24 . However, a number of different hypotheses have been proposed to explain the underlying physiological mechanisms behind the phenomenon, including fatigue, sparse coding and predictive coding 10, [25] [26] [27] . Although there is not yet a consensus on which mechanism provides the most appropriate explanation for the phenomenon, the consequences of this ambiguity are mitigated when used in a carefully controlled experimental design, as all models make the same prediction: if a neural population is sensitive to a particular feature or dimension, then suppression will occur in response to a repetition of this feature, but not others.
The repetition suppression procedure that we used was designed to allow interrogation of the underlying representation of a novel reward. By asking people to imagine and evaluate novel rewards in the scanner, we found that the neural representation of a novel reward was dependent on representations of multiple related and previously experienced rewards. Our data suggest that neuronal networks can construct a novel experience by simultaneous activation of multiple previous memories so that this constructed experience may be evaluated. Although signals in the anterior hippocampus were found to be related to construction, those in mPFC were related to both construction and valuation.
Crucially, unlike other goal-directed decision mechanisms that have been reported 21, 23, 28, 29 , we only found evidence for a construction mechanism when subjects had no direct experience of an outcome, and even then only fleetingly. It is therefore possible that constructed value can provide a substitute for direct experience and train the experiential goal-directed systems that have been studied previously. This training signal may be considered analogous to off-line training of an habitual system that makes use of simulations from an internal goal-directed model 23, [30] [31] [32] . Whereas the teaching signal provided to a habitual system replicates, or fine tunes, previous sensory experience, the teaching signal provided to a goal-directed system may establish an internal model of the future world by repeated imagination of a novel experience.
During the construction process, a second repetition suppression effect was observed between distinct and previously unassociated memories that contributed to the construction. This effect implies that the neural representation of related, compared with unrelated, component items became more similar as a consequence of the pre-scan training task, during which the participants were first exposed to the novel compounds. Notably, given that the suppression was not observed in the familiar group, it seems highly unlikely that this suppression Figure 6 In the absence of sensory exposure, repetition suppression between related components was maintained across the duration of the experiment only if participants assigned high value to the compound goods. (a) Participants from the unfamiliar group showed significant reduction in adaptation between related components over time in mPFC, but not hippocampus (P = 0.041 and P = 0.785, respectively, ROIs are shown). (b,d) The correlations shown in Figure 2 were also significant in mPFC (b) and hippocampus (d) when considering suppression effects between related components in blocks 2 and 3 alone: the amount of suppression across participants correlated positively with the average value of the compound goods (mPFC, r = 0.64, P = 0.002; hippocampus, r = 0.63, P = 0.003). (c,e) A median split of participants into those that assigned high and low values to the compound goods revealed significant suppression between related components in blocks 2 and 3 only in those participants who assigned high value (c, mPFC, High, P = 0.022; High versus Low, P = 0.028; e, hippocampus, High, P = 0.008; High versus Low, P < 0.001). *P < 0.05. Data are presented as mean ± s.e.m. across participants. a r t I C l e S effect reflects inherent similarity between related compared with unrelated components. Rather, the most plausible explanation for this change is that, through repeated representation of a novel compound, previously unrelated memories were recruited simultaneously, inducing a form of plasticity between the underlying representations of necessary components.
In both brain regions involved in construction, the mPFC and hippocampus, plasticity between related components was dependent on the value of the novel compounds, but not the value of components. This value dependence effect suggests that the representations of the component memories were simultaneously present during valuation of the novel compounds. A number of different mechanistic explanations may underlie this dependency. For example, the occurrence of greater blood oxygen level-dependent activity at the time of pairing may induce more plasticity or, when representing a higher value compound, the enhanced availability of neuromodulators, such as dopamine, may serve to facilitate plasticity.
Given that on average participants showed a reduction over time in the initial plasticity observed in mPFC, with comparable dynamics to the construction mechanism, it must be acknowledged that it remains ambiguous whether the adaptation observed between related components reflects classical Hebbian plasticity or even occurs in the same regions as those in which the repetition suppression is observed. However, those participants who assigned high value to the novel goods showed plasticity in mPFC that outlasted the construction process. In the hippocampus, where plasticity was not observed early on in the experiment, the same participants showed plasticity late in the experiment. Thus, the extent to which neural representations of related components became more similar to one another, but also the durability of the effect, was dependent on value attributed to the novel compounds. Irrespective of the underlying nature of the plasticity, the influence of compound value on component memories therefore supports the claim that these representations are paired together at the time of construction of the novel compounds.
The mPFC is regularly activated in studies of valuation 17, 18, [33] [34] [35] [36] , and is particularly notable among such reward-related regions for the flexibility of the value signals that it contains. These computations may, for example, rely on an understanding of the complex structure of the environment 5 , the generalization of concepts learned in different situations 3 or the integration of several disparate sources of information 37 . If subjects are asked to ignore all of their own experiences and preferences and to instead guess what a very different individual would choose, mPFC value signals can immediately reflect the preferences of this new individual 7, 38 . Such online evaluation is a hallmark property of goal-directed choices, which are frequently contrasted with habitual or overlearned choices in studies of animal and human behavior 6, 21, 23, 29, 39, 40 . Previous studies of goal-oriented behavior have, however, focused on situations in which values are known, but must be associated with a particular course of action by inferring the structure of the world 1, 23, 29 . Our data suggest that mPFC can combine previous experiences to construct prospective outcomes de novo on each trial and can then evaluate these constructed outcomes.
Hippocampal preplay mechanisms are known to be important substrates for goal-directed spatial decisions in rodents 8, 41 , and hippocampal value signals can be recorded in situations in which outcomes must be inferred from knowledge of relationships between stimuli in the world 1, 42 . Notably, hippocampal activity is often recorded in concert with a network involving mPFC in studies of spatial memory and scene construction 12, 19, 43 . Consistent with the proposed function of memory in prospective inference 44, 45 , the formation of associative links 46, 47 and constructive episodic simulation 48, 49 , our data suggest that hippocampal activity can also have an active role in constructing de novo experiences in non-spatial contexts.
These findings show that a potential new experience can be prospectively represented and evaluated by invoking multiple memories simultaneously in hippocampus and mPFC. By highlighting this neuronal mechanism, we provide a unique insight into the neuronal computations underlying flexible behaviors that dominate human decision-making and that are difficult to study in animal models.
METHODS
Methods and any associated references are available in the online version of the paper. 
